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SYSTE:" SAFETY IN MIL TRANSPOR'l'NrION 
b y 
QUlWE NORVELL SHITH 
ABS'l'RACT 
'This thesis , "System Safety in Rai l Transportntion," is 
addressed to an individual having a basic technical background but 
little or no experience in this field . 'fhe thesis niscusses the 
need for and the benefits to be obtained by using system safety 
techniques and principl es i n the railroad jndustry . Examples o f 
typical railroad accidents are rcvic\~'ed , and it is pointed out that 
ana l ysis of the haz.ards in the railroad industry prior to lhe 
accidents would ha ve identified problems which eventually resulted 
i n the accidents . The system safety approach , which was develope d 
for use in the aerospace and aviation fields , has proved to be 
extreme l y effective and is now being adapted to many other areas . The 
surf,1;ce modes of transportation have the greatest need for these 
techniques . 'fh e techniques covered i n this thesis i nclll ·le Hazard 
.. Analysis , Fau lt o r Logic Tree Analy sis , Failure ,-10,](>5 and Effects 
Ana l ysis , and Probabilistic Cost Analysis . The lhesis also describes 
a hypothetica l mode l for organizing and implc!OL!nting system safety 
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• 
I. OBJECTIVE AND PROCEDURE 
Rail transportation safety is the end product of many inter-
related efforts. Management decisions and operating policies must 
reflect a new concern for safety. Many occupations must integr ate 
new concepts and new skills . Those engaged in equipment design , 
safety training , establishing ma intenance standards and ope r ating 
policies, using equipment , inspection and compl iance procedures, 
establishing and enforcing standards and safety regulations , as well 
as safety managers, government administrators and safety progr am 
managers , must all be cognizant of a body of knowledge whi ch includes 
appropriate safety considerations. 
This thesis "System Safety in Rail Transportation", was 
initiated as a result of an effort by the U. S. Department of 
Transportation and t~e Transportation Systems Institute of Florida 
Technol ogical University to conduct a research project concerned with 
the analysis of manpower requirements in transportation safety. The 
r esearch project is a follow on to recommendations made during a 
workshop on transportat ion safety held in November , 1972 . 
The objective of this thesis is to develop a conceptual model 
of a system safety program and organizati on structure fo r an exist-
ing railroad i nvolvi ng t he fol l owing e l ements : 
1 . Review of the magnitude , t r ends, reporting 
criteria , cost of acci dents, and c ustomer 
attitude in the railroad industry. 
2. Review of safety r egulations. 
3. Review of the "state-of-the-art" in system 
safety. 
4. Development of a hypothetical model for 
system safety in rail transportation. 
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5. Examples of system safety techniques applied 
to the railroad industry. 
As can be determined very little has been done along the lines 
of applying the principles of sys tem safety to the operations of 
railroads. This thesis is not expected to solve the problem, but 
to explore and consider such system safety programs and techniques 
that would enhance the accide nt and fatality problem in the rail 
industry. It is recognized that these initial efforts only serve 
to open the door. It is realized that more comprehensive research 
is needed. 
In addition to discussing the need for system safety, this 
thesis also looks at the benefits to be obtained by using system 
safety techniques in the railroad industry. It is pointed out that 
analysis of the hazards in the railroad industry prior to the 
accidents would have identified problems which eventually resulted 
in the accidents. 
The system safety app~oach encourages visualization of the 
interrelationships of all the components of railroading and brings 
accident possibilities into focus automatically in an orderly 
, 
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manner. - Its effect is to broaden the application of safety from a 
piecemeal problem solving exercise to a safely designed opration. 
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II. OVERVIE\; OF TIlE INDUSTRY 
A. Magnitude 
Although it is beset with many problems, the railroad 
industry in the United States continues to play a significant role 
in the movement of people and goods throughout this nation. The 
sixty eight Class I railroads and their nearly one third million 
miles of track serve every major city in the country. 
The United States has about 28 percent of the worlds' rail-
road mileage and handles about 24 percent of the freight that moves 
on the railroad of the world. The combined freight capacity of all 
the railroad cars in the United States totals over 119 million tons. 
The average freight train carries over 1,800 tons of freight in 70 
cars. 
Total railway mileage has decreased about 46,000 miles since 
1920 , but railroads carry more than three-fourths again as much 
freight today as in 1920. 
Railroads in the United States represent an investment of 
more than $37 billion. About 52 percent of this investment is in 
fixed property. About 48 percent is in rolling stock. Over 530 
companies comprise the railroad system of the United States. 
Freight accounts for about 90 cents of every dollar of income 
earned by the U. S. railroads. 
In terms of overall progress, the American railroads are, 
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for the most part, continuing to improve their position both 
operationally and financially within the total spectrum of 
transportation activities. The Year 1972 appeared to be somewhat 
of a pivotal year in this regard with operating revenues reaching 
a record high of $13.4 billion. Freight traffic volume and freight 
revenues were on the upswing, but so were expenses. The rate of 
return on net investment was 2.95 percent. 
On the merger front, the Illinois Central and Gulf Mobile 
and Ohio finally joined forces by mid-year after a string of court 
cases. 
The industry's candidate for the longest-running labor 
dispute, the Fireman-Manning case, was finally settled. Also, 
studies of the Railroad Retirement System paved the way for settle-
ment by 1973. 
Railroads made significant progress in getting attention for 
legislative propos~ls. However, the Surface Transportation Act, 
which looked like it would put railroads on an equal footing with 
other carriers, disappeared with the 92nd Congress. 
The transportation spotlight in 1972 was on the rail movement 
of export grain. Spurred by a 17.6 percent increase in grain 
carloadings in the final six months of 1972, the nation's major 
railroads achieved an all-time record in freight traffic for one 
year - 7.78 billion ton/miles. Heavy grain movements continued 
into 1973 and, in the first four months, carloadings of grain were 
up 37 percent over 1972. All rail traffic, in fact, increased 
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8.5 percent in ton/miles as compared with the same period of 1972. 
The increased demand for freight service was expected to continue 
throughout 1973. 
The speed of the trains vary from 10-15 miles per hour on 
Class I track to 110 miles per hour on Class 6 track. The average 
speed for passenger trains is 41 miles per hour and 21 miles per 
hour for freight trains. 
B. Trends 
Throughout its history. the railroad industry has maintained 
a reputation as a safe method of transportation . In recent years 
this reputation has been tarnished by many publicized accidents 
involving the older systems. However, with the exception of water 
transportation, the fact clearly remains that passengers or freight 
on board a train have not been subjected to the incidence of 
fatality or freight loss associated with other modes of transporta-
tion. 
As seen in Figure 1, railroad accidents have increased 
steadily since 1964, from 5,317 to 10,419 in 1974. However, railroad 
fatalities have decreased from 880 in 1964 to 689 in 1974. 
Preliminary statistics for calendar year 1974 show that train 
accidents increased from 9,698 in 1973 to 10,419 in 1974. However , 
the rate of increase in train accidents in 1974, was lower than in the 
previous year. The 1974 increase is estimated at 7.4 percent . 
Statistics for the year 1974 indicate that injuries to rail-
road employees on duty were 15,641, compared to 13,098 for 1973. 
CY 1964 6S 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 7S 
Fig_ 1. Railroad Accidents and Fatalities 
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FatalitIes to railroad employees on duty declined from 158 1n 1973, 
to 140 in 1974. Casualties in grade crossing accidents dec lined 
from 3,306 in 1973 to 3,275 in 1974. For 1973, the rail industry 
s uffe red 0.07 passenger fatalities per 100 million passenger miles 
while passenger fatalities on buses were 0 . 24, domestic airlines 
0.10, and automobiles and taxies were 1.70 (1) . In terms of 
empl oyee safety, the rail industry compares favorably with other 
heavy industries. 
c . Reporting Criteria 
Statistics in this report are based on a monetary reporting 
threshold which involves train accidents of $750 or more damage to 
equipment, track or roadbed, and personal injury. The personal 
injury includes accidents which incapacitates a person from 
performing acceptable the duties assigned to him. 
Effective January 1, 1975, the reporting criteria were 
revised in order to correct the distortion that has occurred over 
the years in the statistics relevant to reportable train accidents 
due to inflation. The criteria for reportability in the personal 
injury category have also been revised to be comparable with the 
Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Act r equirements. 
A new reporting threshold , which will be reflected in the 1975 
reports, is for $1750 in damage s to railroads on track equipment, 
signals, track, track structures, and roadbed. This monetary 
threshold will be adjusted every two years in increments of $100 to 
reflect inflation pertinent to railroad train accidents. The 1975 
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cri teria for reporting of personal injuries define "Reportable" as 
being any event arising from the operation of a railroad which 
results in medical treatment, restriction of work or motion, loss 
of workdays, loss of consciousness, or any occupational illness of 
a railroad employee as diagnosed by a physician (2). 
D. COst of Accidents 
The major causes of accidents are human factors, equ ipment, 
and track. Associated with each accident is a damage cost. The 
average damage cost related to accidents, as a result of human 
factors was $12,337, defects in equipment was $21,360, and defects 
in way and structures was $16,225. The total cost of damages for 
the 10,419 accidents reported in 1974 was $175,354,810. This 
averages to $16,830 per accident. 
For 1974, track defects caused 41 percent of accidents, 
equipment defects caused 20 percent while human error caused 20 
percent. 
Existing track standards cover 98 percent of the reported 
causes of all track accidents. Therefore, it appears obvious that 
the major effort in the track area must be to obtain better 
compliance with these regulations. This means better inspection 
and compliance actions by the railroads themselves and the identifi-
cation of trouble areas by Federal Railroad Administration and State 
track inspectors. Recently adopted equipment regulations cover 97 
percent of the equipment defects causing train accidents. Again, a 
major effort must be made to obtain better compliance with equipment 
10 
standards (I). 
E. Customer Attitude 
According to Nick Thimmesch, a Washington editor writing in 
the Orlando Sentinel, the ride is getting bumpier and bumpier over 
most of the nation's railway roadbeds and tracks (3). Train 
derailments have been increasing over the past few years even though 
injuries and deaths are fewer from train accidents. Nearly all 
derailments are freights. The resultant economic loss in the past 
10 years is about $1 billion. The potential damage is even greater 
because freights haul increasingly l arge shipments of hazardous 
materials, like propane and vinyl chloride. 
Rail passenger fatalities per 100 million miles arc 
substantially lower than airlines and buses, and far lower than 
auto travel. Still , derailment , the number one cause of train 
accidents , presents a serious problem and broken rails are caused by 
poor maintenance. Poor maintenance results when railroads are broke , 
which many of them are. 
The Interstate Commerce commission authorized a 10 percent 
rate increase in June 1974 with the provision that railroads perform 
postponed maintenance. But better rail days are coming. The bankrupt 
railroads will soon get several hundred million dollars in guaranteed 
loans and subsidies from the U. S. Government to improve track and 
equipment. The United States has the technology and the need for a 
better railroad system. 
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III. REVIEW OF SAFETY REGULATIONS 
For almost 50 years after their beginning, railroads in the 
u.s. were subject to little governmental regulation. Regulation at 
first was largely at the state level, but public sentiment resulted 
in the passage in 1887, of the Interstate Commerce Act, which placed 
the railroads under federal regulation. Later, other acts broadened 
and extended the areas of federal regulation so that the railroads 
finally had to clear through the Interstate Commerce Commission 
almost all proposals for changes in such matters as financing, 
equipment standards, signaling and rates. 
With the establishment of the u.s. Department of Transportation 
(DOT) on April I, 1967, administration of nine rail safety laws 
previously administered by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
was transferred to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). Thus, 
the Federal Railroad Administration is now responsible for the 
administration of the Safety Appliance Acts, the Ash Pan Act, the 
Locomotive Inspection Act, the Accident Reports Act, the Signal 
Inspection Act, the Hours of Service Act, and the Transportation of 
Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles Act, all with respect to 
railroad transportation (1). 
The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, gave the Secretary 
of Transportation authority to regulate all areas of railroad 
safety. The Secretary delegated this authority to the Federal 
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Railroaa Administration. The task is complex, and FRAts initial 
efforts were directed toward the adoption of track and equipment 
standards. Through a number of studies, FRA is now developing both 
a short term action plan and a longer range plan to provide a basis 
for directing the federal safety program. 
In addition to the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, the 
FRA also has the legislative authority granted under the Rail Safety 
Improvement Act of 1974. These acts provide for an effective safety 
program with a combination of research, regulations and enforcement . 
There are now eight states participating in the rail safety 
track program. They are; Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington. These states are engaged in 
the performance of investigation and surveillance activities. A 
state may participate in this program if the regulations and safety 
practices applicable to railroad facilities, equipment, rolling 
stock, and operations are regulated by a state agency. This agency, 
usually the State Department of Transportation or the State Public 
Service Commission, must submit an annual certification. 
State participation regulations require state track inspectors 
to meet the same qualifications as their federal counterparts. 
However, this program has been hampered in expanding participation 
to a greater number of states chiefly because of the prescribed 
inspector qualifications. Few states already employ inspectors 
with sufficient track experience, and, because of the lower level of 
state salaries, some states have not been able to recruit qualified 
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candidates. 
According to the Railroad Safety Act of 1970, laws, rules, 
regulations, orders and standards relating to railroad safety shall 
be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A state may adopt 
or continue in force any law or regulation until the Department of 
Transportation has adopted a rule or law to cover the subject matter 
of the state requirement. A state may also adopt or continue in 
force an additional or more stringent law or regulation when 
necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard, 
when not incompatible with any federal law, and when not creating an 
undue burden on interstate conrnerce. 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has the 
authority to determine the cause or probable cause of conditions and 
circumstances relating to accidents. This authority may be delegated 
to any office or official of the NTSB or to any office or official 
of the Department of Transportation. 
In a system that is dependent heavily upon fulfillment of 
special procedures, it is essential that action be monitored to ensure 
compliance with those procedures. One prime prerequisite for 
monitoring procedures or rules is to establish rules that distinguish 
compliance or non-compliance before an accident occurs. If a rule 
is unforceable, it is of little value in controlling safety. 
14 
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IV. STATE-OF-THE-ART IN SYSTEM SAFETY 
In the beginning as with every new discipline the System 
Safety pioneers struggled to develop an acceptable definition of 
"their thing." Years later, although many definitions have been 
"coined" a standard simple, understandable definition eludes us. 
One definition of "System Safety" is the optim\.lJl\ degree of 
hazard elimination and/or control wi thin the constraints of 
operational effectiveness, time and cost, attained through the 
specific application of management, scientific and engineering 
principles throughout all phases of a system life cycle (4) . 
Ou=ing the 1960's several appraoches to System Safety 
Programs were tried all of which proved to be inadequate. There 
was some effort to quantify safety requirements by specifying 
accident probabilities and requiring a demonstration of these 
probabilities by analysis. 
Although system safety was developed primarily as a risk 
management tool for complex aerospace systems, the logic and 
techniques developed have many applications for non-aerospace 
products and systems. To achieve the goal of complete safety -- the 
freedom of risks of injury or loss of equipment or property -- is 
impractical. It is practical however, to try to approach this 
goal not only for moral reasons but also for cost effectiveness. 
This definition of practical approach and assurance of acceptable 
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risks is the primary business of system safety. Briefly, this is 
accomplished by translating prior safety experience, engineering 
analyses, safety research and management actions into a stated 
acceptable risk of injury or loss of material. 
System Safety techniques, as developed and employed on weapon 
systems and space projects can unquestionally be used advantageously 
in the design and manufacture of any product and in any industry. 
The trick is to select those system safety features which are 
canpatible with the product line or indus try and apply them 
effectively without compromising ability to compete in the market. 
In other words the cost of the system safety application, and its 
predicted impact on cost, performance, and service must be accurately 
predicted if it is to be successful. At the same time, results 
must be answered which provide reasonable measures to minimize the 
risk of injury or damage to persons or property, giving full regard 
to applicable industry standards, regulatory requirements, technolog-
ical developments, and the standards of care required by society. 
The advantages of the new technology "System Safety" have 
been demonstrated in aerospace, aviation, and military activities. 
Basic principles used in "System Safety" include the analysis of 
system to identify hazards and the adoption of methods to eliminate 
or control those hazards. Many management and engineering methods 
currently in use in the aerospace and aviation industries are being 
adopted for use in other areas. However, the procedures of analysis 
under the concepts of "System Safety" have not as yet been adopted 
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in the $urface modes of transportation. 
An accident cause is, in actuality , an extension of a hazard 
to its potential. The term "hazard" is preferred as it is not 
difficult to visualize man as an accident cause, but to categorize 
man as a hazard places a different perspective on the interpretation. 
It is easy to dismiss an accident as resulting from an employee's 
negligence, when in fact, the accident may have resulted from the 
failure of the system. 
The railroad safety system, like all other systems, includes 
four components: (a) management, (b) man, (e) machine and (d) media 
(environment) (5). The Ven diagram in Figure 2 illustrates the 
interface of these components for the safety of the railroad system. 
It should be noted that the safety factors involving man's 
performance in the system cannot stand alone, but must be interfaced 
with management, machine, environment , or various combinations of 
each or all. A man-failure must involve a system failure in a safe 
system. 
It is impossible or uneconomical to eliminate all hazards in 
the railroad system, but other choices are available. If the hazard 
presents a risk that cannot be assumed economically or sociologically, 
the system must be made tolerant to the hazard. This can be done 
by three methods. 
The installation of safety devices that do not require human 
intervention to function i s the preferred method of making a system 
tolerant to a hazard. A second method of making a system tolerant 
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to hazards involves the installation of warning devices. ~1ese 
devices are less reliable than safety devices as they require human 
intervention to respond to the warning given. The third method of 
making a system tolerant to hazards involves the establi shment of 
special procedures such as operating rules, bulleting , or special 
instructions. For the most part , the safety of the railroad system, 
as we know it, is dependent largely upon this method. As one would 
expect , the preferred method of making a system tolerant to a 
hazard also is generally the most expensive. The initial cost of 





Fig. 2. Interrelationship of Safety Factors 
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V. HYPOTHETICAL MODEL PROGRAM FOR SYSTEM SAFETY IN 
RAIL TRANSPORTATION 
A. Introduction 
In order to clarify the safety activities in the rail 
transportation industry, the following is set forth as a basic 
program model to clearly establish its operational effectiveness 
in the industry. It consists essentially of an outline of the 
relationships of management and employee responsibilities which 
are necessary for this type of safety program. 
It is felt that this model should become a basic part of 
management policy and help govern its judgment on matters of 
operation equally with considerations of types of service offered, 
budget distribution, personnel relations, and other phases of 
management policy. 
This model program is administered, upon approval, by the 
assistant vice-president of system safety. His primary purpose is 
to assist management in the recognition, elimination and/or control 
of hazards particular to that industry. 
Table 1 depicts the hypothesized System Safety and 
Operations Department Operational Control Modules in each of the 
eight sub-department groupings. Functionally similar modules, 
such. as security and property protection, are aligned horizontally 
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activities carried out by the sub-department as shown vertically in 
the figure. A check in the column under the sub- department indicates 
that the function that is aligned horizontally with it is performed 
by someone in that particular sub-department (6) . 
B. Purpose 
The first step to developing a System Safety program is to 
determine needs of the industry, employee, and customer . To start 
with , this can be rather vague. However, this is an iterative 
process and further iterations will result in necessary specifics. 
To state that the program will make the system safe gives little 
idea of what it is to do. To state that the program will reduce, 
to an acceptable level, the possibility of accidental personnel o r 
passenger injury, equipment, freight , or facility damage whiCh 
could result in significant loss, gives a little better idea of why 
the program is there and what the program goal s a r e. 
The management of rail transportation companies hold in high 
regard the safety , welfare, and health of the public and their 
employees . The System Safety and Operations Department in this 
hypothetical model was organized for the purpose of grouping under 
the administration of a vice-president , the safety and operations 
related functions previously being performed in the operating, 
finance and law departments. specifically the following functional 
groups comprise the Systems Safety and Operations Department : 
Security and Property Protection. Health Care and Insurance, 
Freight Damage Prevention , Personal Injury Prevention, Transportation , 
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Engineering and Research, Locomotive and Track Maintenance, and 
Signals and Train Controls. 
The reason for organizing the safety related functions was 
the need to develop a closer degree of coordination and cooperation 
between related activities, directed toward the goals of (~ 
reducing the human suffering and expense of personal injuries, and 
{~ the expense and customer dissatisfaction related to freight 
loss and damage. Too often, the responsibility for achieving 
these goals have been to widely distributed. Not only should this 
model be more effective, but also, labor savings should be realized. 
In recognition of this and in the interest of modern management 
practice, this model will constantly work toward the following 
safety goals: 
A. Identify safety - critical systems, subsystems, 
components events, and operations. 
B. Produce meaningful design, operation, and 
training criteria to control identified hazards. 
C. Define acceptable risks and provide trade-off guidance. 
D. Verify that safety design criteria have been met 
and/or provide guidance for trade-off decision. 
E. Examine the system and its life cycle to identify 
possible hazards. 
F. Provide management with visibility of efforts to 
control hazards. 
These goals will be realized by performing the following ten 
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pasic safety functions: 
1 . Interpretation of needs 
2. Interpretation of laws 
3. Program Planning and Development 
4. Program Administration 
5. Safety analysis and design 
6. Inspection and Compliance 
7. Accident investigation 
8. Enforcement and security 
9. Safety training 
10. Other safety services. 
These basic safety functions are shown in Figure 3. 
C. The Information Network For System Safety 
The safety information network is only one of the several 
kinds of networks found in railroad organizations; other systems 
include money, personnel , work orders , and capital equipment networks. 
The system safety specialist, in laying the groundwork for the 
segmental development of a properly integrated system, must go 
beyond a monolithic conception as shown in Figure 4. He must 
recognize that not all information processes are equally strongl y 
tied together in the company. This is a basis for initial s ub-
division of the universe of inrormation processing in the company 
into conceptually manageable parts. 
This problem is multidimensi onal. If Figure 4 is reviewed , 
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compliance, accident investigation, safety training, etc., occur 
in more than one network. Therefore the view may be adopted, that 
networks should be organized along the lines of similarity of 
activity, regardless of the functional loci of parts of the 
activities. 
It has been postulated that two kinds of information systems 
exist; major (one that affects the entire organization), and minor 
(not of minor importance, but one that applies only to a limited 
part of the organization) (7). The major safety information systems 
are inspection, hazardous materials, historical data, new technology, 
accident, and injury, operational hazards reports, external 
compliance directions, and catastrophic situations. 
Planning is the most basic of all the safety functions 
because it involves the selection of organizational and departmental 
objectives and the determination of the means to achieve these 
objectives. Essentially, planning is the same whether applied to 
an entire organization or to any hierarchical level in it. Planning 
generally involves five steps or processes as seen in Figure 5. 
They are: 
1. Recognizing hazards or unsafe situations. 
2. Defining problems or unsafe situations and 
developing alternate courses of action. 
3. Making a decision. 
4. Implementing the plan 
S. Checking control performance against the plan 
26 .. 
.. Recognition of A ... Hazard or an 
Unsafe Situation 
" Define Problem or 
Unsafe 5i tuation and 
Develop Alternative 





" Control Perfonnance 
Against Plan 
Fig. 5. Major Steps in System Safety Planning 
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. 
Now that the networks have been discussed, the conceptual 
flow of information will be reviewed. As seen in Figure 6, no 
matter what type of information is fed into the system, the flow 
• 
process is basically the same. A piece of information is analyzed, 
investigated, and some form of action is taken. The results of 
this process is then fed back into the system. 
The information sources of the system safety department can 
be classified into three broad types; (a) environmental, (b) 
competitive, and (el internal (8). The environmental information 
ccnsists of; 
(al governmental policies 
(b) econcmic trends 
(c) technology 
(d) factors of operation 
The competitive information includes such things as; 
(a) industry demand 
(b) firm demand 
(e) competition - past, present, and future 
Often internal premises a£fect the planning and operating 
decisions of the safety department more so than external information. 
As they relate to the total system safety process they are; 
(a) policies 
(b) financial plans 
(c) investigations and inspections 
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It was previously shown that the conceptual operations of 
the system safety department could be defined in terms of the 
elements and properties of information source (input), analysis, 
investigation, and action taken (output), and in a strict sense 
this is so. However, this system is dynamic and changes inevitably 
occur. Moreover, in this dynamic system it is necessary to review, 
periodically or continuously, the state of the output in order to 
make necessary alterations because of changes. 
It is important to understand how the elements of the safety 
department function as a system because, like any other system, 
the department operates through the medium of information. 
The conceptual system flow chart as seen in Figure 6 is a 
common method of indicating the general structural of an information 
system. This system flow as illustrated by the flow chart, is 
quite general in nature and indicates only the main components of 
the system. At this sta~e , the chart does not indicate what pro-
cessing occurs at particular steps in the flow or what specific 
data, equipment , or personnel are involved. However, the chart is 
extremely important because it provides the foundation and framework 
upon which detailed specifications will follow. 
D. Organization For Syst.em Safety 
The system safety concept is the elimination of hazards in 
the system. This is the most economical way to r educe accidents 
which result in loss of life and property. System safety not only 
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identifies hazards, but also shows the likelihood of their activation 
and points out the alternative methods available to eliminate them. 
With this visibility into the problem area, management can then 
decide which hazards to eliminate , which hazards to control, and 
which risk to assume. 
The activities of hazard recognition and e limination or 
control encompass the sum total of Accident Prevention. If these 
activities were perfectly achievable all else could be disregarded 
and supplemental activities would not be n~cessary. Since they are 
not perfectly achievable, the goal must be to first accomplish them 
in the best way possible and then apply supplemental management 
and technical resources to enhance the desired level of safety. 
These activities are the responsibility of every director 
as shown in Figure 7. The general hazards associated with rail 
transit are readily determined from inspections, investigations, 
and the Federal Accident Statistics . This organizational structure 
permits flexible and efficient response to the rail industry's 
safety and operation needs. This structure affordS the department 
the mobility and exposure necessary to carry out its programs. 
To carry out the responsibilities assigned the System Safety 
and Operations Department as seen in Figure 7, the department is 
composed of staff and field personnel. The staff personnel provide 
the general direction to all accident prevention programs as well 
as to the administrative matters of the department. Field 
personnel carry out safety programs in the field as well as preparing 
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reports of investigative activities. 
E. Responsibility 
The system safety organization shal l be responsible for 
managing and performing the overall system safety program. The 
responsibilities and functions of those directly associated with 
system safety pOlicies and implementation of the program shall be 
clearly defined in this section . 
Ideally, it should be possible for any given mode of 
transportation to describe a unique system safety organization 
which would be optimal for carrying out a safety program suitable 
for that particular mode of transportation. From a practical 
point of view, it is obvious that no such single organizational 
entity can be described. However, it can be stated, that all of 
the task in the domain of safety which need to be performed so 
that a system may be operated safely can always be specified. It 
can further be stated that there are usually a variety of ways to 
organize so that these tasks will be performed satisfactori ly. The 
job descriptions that follOW are only one way to accomplish the 






The Vice-President of the system safety and operations 
department has the responsibility to develop an effective 





Assistant to Vice President 
The Assistant to Vice President serves as an administrative 
assistant to the Vice President. He makes recornm~,dations 
concerning policy in administrative, personnel, and other 
matters pertaining to the eight sub-departments in the 
System Safety and Cperations Department and is directly 
responsible to see that all administrative policies and 
directions are carried out by these groups to achi eve 
the mission of reducing safety losses. 
1 . Responsible for the effective administration of all 
offices in the department , which includes all record 
keeping, reports , payroll, requisitions for and repairs 
to office equipment , assignment of leased vehicles and 
personnel. 
2. Supervision of office clerical force , bulletining 
and assigning contract-covered positions. 
3. Serves as departmental personnel officer, and 
supervises the preparation and maintenance of 
personnel records, preparation of authority for 
payroll changes and submits them to the sub-department 
heads for approval. Makes recommendations regarding 
promotions and merit increases. 
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4, Prepares the staff departmental budget and 
coordinates the preparation of budgets by the sub-
departments. He also constantly keeps a close check 
on expenditures and brings to the attention of the 
sub-department heads those areas in which expenses 
are unnecessary or out of line. 
5. Administers lahor agreements, investigates and replies 
to claims and grievances and prepares recommendations 
for handling by labor relations. 
6. Prepares directives pertaining to activities of 
the various sub-departments and replies to correspondence 





Assistant Vice President for System Safety 
Assistant Vice President for System Safety under the 
overall direction of the Vice President, exercises 
general supervision over the four s~departments 
comprising the system safety group. Establishes yearly 
objectives for each of the sub-departments as well as 
periodic goals for progress which must be achieved 
during the year. Honitors progress, and initiates 
corrective action when indicated, to assure that all 
departmental and sub-departmental goals are met on 
schedule. Makes policy recommendations to the 
Vice President, also has direct responsibility for 
implementation of all departmental programs and policies. 
1. Under the overall direction of the Vice President, 
supervises the activities through department directors, 
of the four sub-departments comprising the system safety 
group. 
2. Responsible for continuous appraisal of functions 
performed by each group and of devising methods of 
eliminating non-productive functions or, in the 
alternative, of improving their effectiveness to 
insure that all goals are met on schedule. 
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3. Periodically reviews organizational structure of 
each sub-department to be certain that it is properly 
designed to perform the responsibilities assigned to it. 
4. In consultation with sub-department directors, 
evaluates personnel to ascertain their effectiveness 
in the positions to which they are assigned, and to 
determine which individuals are capable of taking on 
increased responsibilities as well as those whose 
r esponsibilities should be reduced. 
5. Consults with personnel of other railroads, and 
industrial concerns to find better methods of reducing 
or eliminating safety losses. 
6. Works closely with other departments to assist in 
designing and implementing methods and equipment to 
enable them to carry out their responsibilities 







Specialist in System Safety 
Specialist in System Safety , reports directly to the 
Assistant Vice President of Sy~tem Safety. He is 
responsible for the development and maintenance of 
formalized procedures for the analysis of system safety 
that force a logical examination of all elements of the 
railroad system and identify all possible sources of 
accidents. 
1 . Identification and classification of all hazards 
2. Application of system safety techniques to 
railroading operations 
3. Aid to Assistant Vice President in the development 





Director of Security and Property Protection 
Director of Security and Property Protection, exercise 
general supervision over the Security and Property 
Protection sub-department. Has direct and immediate 
responsibility for instituting and implementing programs 
to prevent theft and damage caused by vandalism and 
other reasons to property owned by the company and 
that which is entrusted to its care. Functions as 
liaison in area of his responsibility with other railroad 
police departments , federal , state and other agencies. 
Directs activities concerning the accumulation of 
data needed to pin point problem areas. 
1. Under the overall direction of the Assistant 
Vice President of System Safety , administers the 
affairs of the Security and Property Protection 
sub-department . 
2. Has direct responsibility for the selection, 
training and overall efficiency of personnel in 
his group. 
3. Develops and implements programs designed to 
combat thefts , vandalism, trespassing, and other 
problems. 
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4. Keeps abreast of industry practices in the area of 
his responsibility to improve the security and property 
protection function. 
S. Monitors effectiveness of practice engaged in by 




Director of Health care and Insurance 
Director of Health care and Insurance, responsible 
for developing and implementing health care and 
insurance programs, that are comparable with the 







Director of Freight Damage Prevention 
Director of Freight Damage Prevention, exercises 
general supervision over the freight damage 
prevention group under the overall direction of 
the Assistant Vice President of System Safety. 
Has direct and ~ediate responsibility for the 
administration of the group, and for the 
development and implementation of programs 
designed to eliminate damage to lading in transit. 
1. Administers the affairs of the Freight Damage 
Prevention sub-department in tt~ areas of 
responsibility assigned to it . 
2. Has direct responsibility for the selection, 
training and overall efficiency of personnel assigned 
to the group . 
3. Responsible for the establishment of procedures 
designed to enable the group to effectively carry 





Director of Personal Injury Prevention 
Director of Personal Injury Prevention, exercises 
general supervision over the Personal Inju~~ 
Prevention sub-department under the overall direction 
of the Vice President of system safety. Has direct 
and immediate responsibility for instituting and 
implementing programs to prevent accidents and 
otherwise reduce personal and fatal injuries and 
property damage. Has responsibility for inspection 
of buildings and facilities to identify and eliminate 
hazards. Is responsible for compliance with all 
federal and state statutes dealing with safety . 
Directs activities concerning the accummulation of 
data needed in connection with the Federal Railroad 
Safety Act . 
1. under the overall direction of the Assistant 
Vice President of System Safety , he administers the 
affairs of the Personal Injury Prevention sub-depart-
ment in the areas of responsibility assigned to it. 
2. Has direct responsibility for the selection , 
t r aining and overall efficiency of personne l in the 
department. 
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3. Must develop programs to promote safety and prevent 
accidents and implement these programs to see that they 
are carried out efficiently and effectively. 
4. Has the responsibility of directing activities to 
secure and analyze pertinent data concerning causes and 
effects of accidents. 
5. On the basis of data accummulated, must monitor the 
effectiveness of the programs he institutes and make 
such changes as seen indicated. Changing old programs 
and initiating new ones is a continuous process. 
6. Must devise plans to meet any emergency situation 
arising out of a derailment or other accident involving 
volatile or explosive material and must be certain that 
those persons responsible for carrying out the disaster 





Manager of Compliance and Administration 
Manager of Compliance and Administration , serves in a 
staff capacity under the overall direction of the 
Director of Personal Injury Prevention , and assists 
the Director in administering and coordinating the 
staff and field positions of the Personal Injury 
Prevention sub- department. Serves as reporting 
officer to the Department of Transportation and 
various state commissions in safety , accident re l ated 
matters . Acts as compliance officer for requirements 
of federal, state and local regulatory agencies. 
1. Manages the efficient and economical operation of 
the office of the Director , and assists in the 
preparation of annual budget and monthly budget 
variance reports. 
2. Supervises the preparation and distribution of 
all reports, including personal injuries bo employees , 
passengers, tresspassers and others, crossing accidents , 
etc., to federal and state agencies . Initiates reports 
to proper parties of all incidents involving huzardous 
materials to ensure that shipper and carrier errors 
are conne cted. 
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3. Maintains central library for safety regulations , 
reference materials and literature pertaining to 
heal th and safety . 
4. Maintains contact and close working relationships 
with such agencies as the Bureau of Explosives, 
Department of Transportation, Hazardous Materials 





Manager of Planning and Training 
Manager of Planning and Training, serves in a staff 
capacity under the overall direction of the Director, 
and assists the director in coordinating the staff 
and field functions of the Personal Injury Prevention 
sub-department. Responsible for developing and 
implementing programs and training procedures for 
Personal Injury Prevention activities. Reviews 
adequacy of safety programs initiated by the 
department. Responsible for developing management 
information systems and fer analytical reviews of 
program effectiveness. 
1. Has direct responsibility for developing effective 
programs and training procedures for Personal Injury 
Prevention sub-department activities , including 
operations, visual aids, posters, contests, gimmicks, 
etc. 
2. Analyzes results obtained from the departments 
safety programs and recommends policies to ensure that 
programs and procedures are effective and consistent 
with the objectives of the Operating sub-depar~ent 
as well as the System Safety sub-department . 
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3. Conducts training sessions for departmental per sonnel , 
and makes spontaneous and prepared speeches at safety 





Manager of Safety 
Manager of Safety serves in a staff capacity under 
the overall direction of the director. He has the 
responsibility for planning, establishing a.nd 
directing safety, fire prevention, hazardous matez:ials 
handling and environmental controls programs. The 
activi~ie5 of this group must be accomplished through 
effective implementation of a safety program. 
1 . Assists in coordinating the activities of staff 
and field personnel in the areas of responsibility 
assigned to the group. 
2. Isolates problem areas, develops answers to 
problems and advises director in safety activities 
and special safety matters. 
3. Recommends standards for personal protective 
equipment, in consultation with the Operations , sub-
department officers and outside experts . 
4. Recommends adoption or revision of safety rules 






Motive Power and Equipnent Inspector 
Motive Power and Equipment Inspector, under the 
direct supervision of the M3nager of safety. Is 
responsible for the improvement and advancement of 
railroad safety in areas related to the design , 
construction, inspection, maintenance and use of 
railroad rolling stock including motive power 
equipment, and related appurtenances. 
1. Inspects and tests railroad rolling stock , motive 
power equipment and related appurtenances. 
2. Investigates serious railroad accidents and 
complaints alleging non-compliance with laws and 
safety standards. 
3 . Prepares and distributes reports regarding 
accidents, potential hazards , and non-compliance "lith 





Signals and Train Control Inspector 
Signals and Train Control Inspector , under the direct 
supervision of the Manager of Safety_ He must 
implement the department safety policies related 
to signal and train control systems, insure 
compliance with laws , regulatio~s , standards and 
rules relative to the design construction, 
maintenance , inspection and USc of signal and 
train control systems . 
1. Assist in the review of specifications and plans 
of the department for rebuilding existing signal or 
traffic contro l systems. 
2. Investigates serious railroad accidents and 
complaints alleging non-compliance with the laws and 
safety standards. 
3. Inspects and test signal and train control systems, 
and campanen ts. 
4. Prepares and distributes reports regarding accidents 





Operating Practices- Hazardous Material Inspector 
Operating Practices- Hazardous Material Inspector, 
serves under the Manager of Safety and is responsible 
for investigating accidents , issuing operating practices , 
occupational safety conditions, transportation of 
hazardous material. 
1. Investigates serious accidents and complaints 
alleging non-compliance with the laws and safety 
standards. 
2. Reviews records to determine whether employees 
connected with the movement of trains are permitted 
to be or remain on duty contrary to the provisions of 
the law. 
3. Maintains complete reference library on hazardous 
materials. 
4. Prepares and distributes reports regarding accidents 






Track Inspectors serve under the Manager of Safety and 
is responsible for the improvement and advancement of 
ra i lroad safety in areas related to the design, 
construction , inspection , maintenance , and use of 
railroad tracks and their related appurtenances. 
1. Makes personal inspections to determine the 
condition of the roadbed, track struction , track 
geometry, and track related devices . 
2. Investigates serious railroad accident and 
complaints alleging non-compliance with the laws 
and safety standards_ 
3. Prepares and distributes reports regarding 







Safety Agent, serves under the Manager of Planning 
and Training, is responsible for having a good 
working knowledge of the safety and operating rules 
of the company. 
1. carry out field inspections aimed at detecting 
and reporting unsafe work practices, rule violations, 
conditions and techniques or lack of them posing 
potential causes for accidents. 
2. Personally investigate all lost time injuries 
3. Assist in training sessions and seminars for 





Analyst, serves under the Manager of Compliance 
and Administration. He assists in the development, 
implementation and review of the management information 
systems used in the System Safety sub-department . 
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The hypothetical system safety model shall provide a 
disciplined approach to methodically control safety aspects and 
evaluate the companies safety activities, identify hazards and 
prescribe corrective action in a timely cost effective manner. 
The model will: 
a) Evaluate technical approaches to systems safety 
b) Identify possible safety interface problems 
c) Highlight special areas of safety consideration 
d) Define areas requiring further safety investigation 
Of course, in addition to the previous basic policy and 
list of responsibilities there should be descriptions of how 
safety committees should operate and descriptions of the 
inspection system to be used. 
In conclusion, the first step in system safety is not a 
technical one . It is concerned with gaining support for the work 
that follows. The system safety personnel must have the support 
of most members of the organization in order to obtain information 
and to obtain acceptance of the final system. At a minimum, 
members of the organization should be informed of the objectives 
and nature of the department. 
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VI. EXAMPLES OF SYSTEM SAFETY TECHNIQUES 
APPLIED TO RAILROADS 
System analysis need not be a highly complicated task . The 
important point is , give~ the system description, a decision must be 
made as to the purpose of the analysis. Once this decision has been 
reached, the analytical technique that will produce the needed data 
is sel ected and applied. 
On initial examination , there appea2' to be many analytical 
tecllniques available for the purpose of identifying hazards and 
evaluating risks. However, a detailed review of these methods will 
r eveal that most of them are modifications of other t echniques , and 
that the modification was made either to accommodate a unique system , 
or to develop a unique set of data. 
There are essentially three basic anal ytical methods: 
1. Hazard anal ysis 
2. Logic tree or fau l t analysis 
3. Failure mode and effects analysis 
In the sections that follow, these three methods will be 
discussed and explained with the use of examples . In addition to 
the three analytical methods mentioned above , the probabilistic 
behavior of accident systerrs will be considered . 
The examples given in the sections that follow are onl y for 
the purpose of illustrating the application of the foregoing 
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principles and procedures to typical situations which might be 
encountered in the rail transportation industry. While they follow 
good industry practice, they are only illustrations, and must not 
be r egarded as a complete engineering analysis of a specific problem. 
The numerical values shown for the probability of occurrence 
of certain events are assumed for illustrative purposes only and 
have no basis in actual operating experience. 
A. Hazard Analysis 
Although there are many definitions of a hazard, for the 
purposes of this paper, a hazard will be defined as any conditions 
which has potential to cause an accident. An accident in turn can 
be defined as a change of operations mode, design or hwnan interface 
which leads to an unwanted transfer of energy due to lack of 
barriers or controls which in turn produces injury to persons, 
property or process. This focuses attention on change , people, 
energy sources and barriers or controls. Changes can occur in the 
nature of the work (such as from operation to maintenance), in the 
environment (from new operating conditions or violent weather 
conditions) in the machinery (from age, upgrading, or replacement), 
in the people (from new or transferred persons), in management 
systems (from reorganization) in procedures (due to design 
modifications) and in numerous other areas. Accident histories 
have shown that changing situations are prone to lead to equipment 
troubles or human error which in turn are likely to trigger accidents. 
The hazard analysis addresses the total system from the 
standpoint of energy sources which can get out of control. The 
basic logic in conducting this analysis is shown in Figure B. 
Initially, the hazards in a particular system are ide ntified 
by analyzing engineering and accident information. A human error 
checklist which is derived from accident/incident experience and 
human engineering data sources can also be helpful. The 
operational task is then broken down in a step-by-step procedure, 
and each step is considered for possibility of human error and 
probability of a basic hazard leading to an accident. Recommendations 
are made to eliminate, or control the hazards, to install saiety 
devices, manning devices or to establish special procedures. 
Once we have defined the basic hazards and human errors which 
should be applied in the analysis operation, we con3ider each of 
them for each operational phase. 
System safety, not only identifies hazards, but also shows 
the likelihood of their activation and points out the alternative 
methods available to eliminate them. A potential hazard assessment 
is usually made using such historical safety " data as accident/ 
incident analyses and safety design, operations and human error 
checklists. Also, an analysis is made of the plans, concepts and 
proposed operating modes for the system. These two efforts result 
in the production of a Preliminary Hazard Analysis. The Preliminary 
Hazard Analysis list all known hazards with classification as safe, 












.c Safety Devices ) 
Identify Hazards 
Vlarning Devi ces 
Special Proceeures 
Fig. 8. Basic Logic in Hazard Analysis 
'" o 
Classification of Hazards 
Class I. Safe: 
Class II. Marginal: 
Class III. Critical : 
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Conditions such that human error, 
deficiency or inadequacy of design , 
or equipment malfunction will not 
result in personnel injury o r equipment 
damage. 
Conditions such that human error, 
deficiency or inadequacy of design, 
or equipment malfunction will degrade 
system performance or damage equipment, 
but counteraction or control can be 
undertaken SUdl that serious injury 
to personnel or significant damage 
will not occur. 
Conditions such that human error, 
deficiency or inadequacy of design, or 
equipment malfunction will cause 
personnel injury , serious equipment 
damage, or will result in a hazard 
requiring immediate corrective action 
for personnel or system survival . 
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Class rJ. catastrophic: Conditions such that hlRnan error, 
deficiency or inadequacy of design , 
or equipment malfunction will 
severely degrade system performance 
and cause subsequent system loss or 
cause death or serious , irreversible 
inj uries to personnel . 
TABLE 2 
HAZARD CLASSIFICATION 





SAFE NONE NONE 
MARGINAL MINOR NONE 
CRITICAL SUBSTANTIAL *TRANSIENT INJURY 
CATASTROPHIC SYSTEH LOSS ** IRREVERSIBLE 
INJURY OR DEATH 
* Transient Injury - is one from which recovery is effected 
with no resultant loss of functional capability or 
shortening of life span . 
** Irreversible Injury (residual) - one which is not transient. 
As may be seen in Figure 9 , the hazard to be evaluated is 
first checked as to its severity . The hazards are then ranked in 
the "totem pole" fashion to establish priorities for judgments and 
actions necessary to eliminating or controlling the hazard. TO 
aid in this ranking, a hazard reduction precedence is used. The 
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first order of priority, of course, is to eliminate the hazards 
and the second order to provide safety devices which control the 
hazards. The third priority is to install warning devices to 
indicate lack of control and the fourth provides for special 
control procedures to prevent or amelioriate potential damage. 
As development of the system proceeds, the Preliminary 
Hazard Analysis, by an iterative process, becomes a hazard cata log. 
This catalog provides a tracking system for each hazard which could 
have catastrophic or critical consequences. Those hazards which 
cannot be eliminated or controlled are identified as potential 
acceptable risks and the logic for these decisions is recorded for 
each hazard item. The hazard catalog then becomes a risk control 
document which is constantly reviewed by project management to 
determine trade-offs in design and operations alternatives. 
In Table 3 the general hazards and some of the sub-hazards 
common to the rail industry, are classified according to the 
categorization criteria just described. 
It has been inferred up to this point that the categorization 
criteria was carefully selected and documented before hazards are 
evaluated. In reality the criteria evolved with hazard evaluation 
efforts as the need for setting priorities was encountered. A 
similar evolution occurred before the Hazard Evaluation Logic 
depicted in Figure 9 was specifically documented. This logic 





COmmon to the Railroad Indus try (10) 
HAZARD 









Any of above with unattended car 
In tunne l or on elevation 
Collision (includes Excessive Stopping Dist.) 
Wi t il othel: train (s) 
Vehicle at Cros~in9 
Person or Vehicle on Track 
Derailment 
In Yard (low speed) 
Revenue Service (moderate speed) 
Revenue Service (high speed) 
Door Opening Underway 
Inadvertent Uncoupling 
In Yard (low speed) 
Revenue Service (moderate speed) 






























System Safety efforts . While this portrayal does not add any 
unique features to the evaluation process , it docs provide an 
ordered reference sequence which assures that each hazard is 
evaluated consistently and with the same order of considerati on . 
The hazard evaluation process in Figure 9 is the heart 
of the System Safety Program under consideration . For this 
r eason a specific example will now be considered on the following 
page. 
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The case to be considered involves excessive stopping distance 
which can clearly be a cause factor in a collision, a hazard of 
potential catastrophic severity (10). This case involves an 
apparent failure of a master controller tip-up handle which typically 
provides the deadman feature on propulsion control equipment. The 
design concept of the handle requires the operator to hold it in a 
depressed condition or experience an automatic emergency brake 
application. With this concept the train is automatically stopped 
if the operator becomes unconscious or leaves his station . In the 
cases reported the handle failed to pop up and activate the brake 
application when released. One of the most likely causes was found 
to be a ndssing spring in the mechanism. HO<;'Iever, other possible 
causes such as the assembly technique, quality control in manufacture , 
and lubrication method were also judged possible. In evaluating 
and controlling this hazard relative to the logic of Figure 9, it 
has already been noted that the results of excessive stopping 
distance could be catastrophic. However, a further consideration was 
that both the handle and the operator would have to fail 
simultaneously for potential collision conditions to be present. 
On this basis, it must be questioned whether the combined protection 
of the tip-up handle and operating procedures were not sufficient 
to consider the hazard controllable. The final conclusion arrived 
at is that protection is adequate but that any simple design 
improvements should be cut in which could prevent binding, and 
special quality control attention should be given. In reality . an 
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. improved screw staking procedures was incorporated in the assembly 
procedure and quality control checks were revised. Additionally, a 
roll pin was added to the handle design to help prevent an 
operator from purposely causing its removal with a pencil or other 
sharp instrument , and thereby defeating the deadman. 
B. Logic Tree or Fault Tree Analysis 
The Fault Tree Analysis begins by identifying an Undesired 
Event whose causes are to be traced. Graphically, this event is 
placed at the top of the page and represents the base of a tree 
whose branch will be developed and will extend downlf/ard. Once the 
undesired event , also called a Top Event, is specified, it is 
necessary to identify the immediate causes which directly could 
cause this top event. Each of these causative events, in turn, can 
be furthe r broken down into subordinate events . This process is 
continued until one arrives at basic input events that cannot be 
broken do\'iT\ further, or for which probability data are available 
so there is no need to go further . This process creates a diagr~~ 
which resemb les a tree whose branches extend and spread out down-
ward , with each branch terminating in basic input events. 
Figure 10 illustrates the diagrammatic arrangement of a 
fault tree, and Figure 11 identifies and defines the geometric 
s~nbo1is that are commonly used in fault tree construction (II). 
It is to be noted that a fa1l1t tree consists of three essential 






























Attached to logic gate to specify condition 
An event caused by one or more other events 
which are identified 
A basic input event that does not require 
further development as to causes 
An event which is not developed further as 
to its causes because of lack of information 
or significance 
An event ",·hich is normal for the system; 
not a fault or failure per se 
AND gate - output event occurs onl y if all 
the inp ut events are present 
OR gate - output event occurs when one or 
more of the input events are present 
COntinuation symbol to i dentical portion 
of faul t tree 
~ transfer IN 
transfer OUT 
Fig. 11. Symbols Used in Fault Tree Construction 
71 
basic logic gates are of two kinds, namely OR gates and AND gates. 
If an output event can be caused by one or more input events, either 
when each acts by itself, or when they act together, these input 
events pass through an OR gate. On the other hand, if an output 
event can be caused only when all input events must act in combina-
tion, these input events pass through an AND gate. 
This concept is illustrated in Figure 12 where the top event 
is defined as a derailment. oerailm~nt is a hazardous condition 
which has long been a major concern in the railroad industry. As 
shown in Figure 12, it can result from a variety of contributing 
factors and conditions such as track or car defects, or any 
oombanat~on of these coupl ed with unproper cperation. A typical 
example would be excessive speed followed by a wheel slide due to 
locked wheels, and subsequent derailment while transitioning a 
worn switch point. Identification of the possible causes is .: 
relatively easy for the hazard of derailment. The elimination or 
correction of these causes can be very diffcult. 
After the fault tree is completely structured and all 
branches terminate in basic input events (circles or diamonds) , 
the next step in the analysis is to calculate the probability of 
occurrence of the top event. The numerical evaluation of a fault 
tree involves calculating the probability of occurrence of an 
output event from the known or previously computed probabilities 
of all input events to the given logic gate. These computations 










































is determined. Therefore it is necessary to know how the probabilities 
of the inputs are related to that of the output through the basic 
logic gates, namely an AND gate or an OR gate. 
To evaluate a fault tree manually, it is necessary to perform 
the following operations (11). 
1. Convert the combinationational properties of all 
the logic elements into Boolean algebraic expressions. 
2. Eliminate all redundancies. 
3. Evaluate algebraic expressions as probabilities using 
numerical data for basic input events. 
The conversion of the logic diagram into algebraic form must 
proceed from the bottom up, with every AND gate representing arrd 
intersection of the inputs, and every OR gate representing a union 
of the inputs. The actual algebraic manipulations follow accustomed 
practice of conventional algebra with an AND gate being analogous 
to a product and an OR gate being analogous to a sum. The same 
results would be obtained if one were to use the notation of set 
theory algebra, namely "u" for a union, or "n" for an intersection. 
Boolean algebra (also known as propositional or symbolic 
algebra) deals only with two states -- yes or no, on or off, success 
or failure, 1 or 0 -- and is therefore useful for handling the logic 
gates of a fault tree which may be considered as either open or 
closed. Since there is almost a one-to-one correspondence between 
the rules of Boolean algebra and those of set theory, the latter 
may be used to explain the concepts involved. 
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In Boolean algebra notation we will be concerned only with 
two operator symbols. The symbol " .. " is used to indicate an 
intersection of two sets which applies to an AND gate. The symbol 
"+" is used to indicate the union of two sets which applies to an 
OR gate. These symbols signify only the above operations and do 
not have the same meaning as the plus sign or product sign of 
common arithmetic. However, to the extent that some of the basic 
laws of common algebra also are valid in Boolean algebra, certain 
manipulations can be carried out in the accustomed manner. The 
following laws are valid in Boolean algebra as well as in common 
algebra (ll). 
A·B = B*A 
A+B = B+A 
A*(B*C) = (A*B)*C 
A+(B+C) = (A+B)+C 




In addition to the above, the following laws apply to 
Boolean algebra and to set theory, but not to common algebra. 
A+A = A 
A*A = A 
A+ (A*B) = A 
A* (MB) = A 












The task of evaluating a fault tree by hand is tedious 
because the algebraic expressions for intermediate events becom~ 
progressively longer as one proceeds up the tree to the top event. 
The procedure for the manual quantitative evaluation of a 
fault tree is illustrated below . The example of Figure 12, derail-
ment, is defined as the undesired event . Numerical value s for the 
basic input events were arbitrarily assumed to permit carrying the 
sample calculations to numerical results. 
The followinb Boolean algebraic equations represent the 
symbolic logic diagram of Figure 12. The sequence shown is from 
the bottan of the tree upward. 
X6 - X1+X2+X3+X4 




X17 - X12+X13+X14 
Fl ~ X6 = X1+X2+X3+X4 
El = X10 = XS+X6+X7 
~ Xl+X2+X3+X4+XS+X7 
°1 = Xl3 = XS+X9+XIO+Xll 














= XIS * X16 













Equation (25) is the final Boolean equation for the top event 
Al in terms of the input events. 
In order to evaluate Equation (25' ~ umerically in terms of 
probability, it is necessary to have probabi lity values for each of 
the input events. Therefore to proceed with the illustration, a set 
of assumed values for these events is given in Table 4. Hypothetical 
values are used because real values are not available in the 
railroad industry, and if they were the railroads probably y,1Quld not 
publish them. Now the probability of the top event can be computed 
by using Equation (25) and inserting numerical values for the 
probabilities of the basic input events. Thus 
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Al = 6.1 x 10 
This value represents the probability of occurrence of the 
top event (derailment) based on the assumed values for the input 
events. 
After the probability of occurrence of the top event is 
determined , it may be desirable to seek ways for reducing this 
pocobability by changing some of the input events. To do this most 
effectively, it is necessary to identify those input events that 















PROBABILITIES FOR INPUT 
EVENTS OF FAULT TREE 
IN FIGURE 12* 













































""'la).:ue.s axe ass\neo. 'tOl: purposes o'i "l.).).usna'tl.on on).y 
and have no other significance. 
criticality is a measure of the relative seriousness of the 
effects of each basic fault, and thus provides a basis for ranking 
the faults for corrective action priori ties . . A cri ticali ty number 
for a given basic input event combines the impact this event would 
have, if it occurred, on the top event , with the likelihood of 
occurrence of the basic event. The computation of a criticality 
number therefore involves two steps (11): 
~. Assign a value of 1.0 to the probability 
of a given basic event, while maintaining 
the probabilities of all other basic events 
at their real values, and compute the 
probability of the top event. 
2. Multiply the result of step 1 by the actual 
probability of the given basic event. 
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The first step yie lds the probability of occurrence of the 
top event assuming that the given basic event has already occurred. 
This result is then modified by the actual likelihood of occurrence 
of the given basic event. 
Criticality numbers are computed in this manner for all basic 
input events, one at a time, and then the basic events can he 
ranked according to their criticality as candidates for corrective 
action. 
The manual computation of criticality values can be done by 
tabular methods. Examples of such computations are given in Table 5 
for the same example used previously for illustrating the 
quantitative evaluation of the fault tree in Figure 12. 
In order to calculate the probability of occurrence of the 
top event , it was previously necessary t o derive the algebraic 
expression for this event, and to compute numbers for each term in 
the algebraic expression using actual probabilities for the basic 
input events. To compute the criticality of each basic event, only 
TIIBIZ 5 
COMPUTATION OF CRITICALITY NUMBER'! FOR BASIC EVE~"I'S 
IN THE FAULT TREE CJf' FIGURE 12 
• Probability of Top Event Probility Value of Term-
of Where Event Valuc of Term if h~en Event Probability - Criticality 
Event Eve'nt Occurs Event Probabil1t:!"'l,O 1.0 Value 
Xl .40Xl0-

















1 6XI0 -6 
X5 : 20 XI0-










5.3XIO- S 1.0 lOXI0- 1 5:<10-6 
X9 • 60XI0-
5 5.3Xl0- 5 1.0 10Xl0-
1 SXID -6 
X
11 








.20XIO-5 5.JXIO-S 1.0 10XIO-
1 2XIO -6 
X
15 









.60XIO-S 5.3Xl0-5 1.0 10Xl0-1 6Xl0-6 
\9 
,JaXIO -5 5 . 3XI0-5 1.0 10XI0 -1 3XI0 -6 
"In Equation 2S 
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the following steps are necessary: 
1. Recalculate the value of the algebraic term 
in which the basic event occurs, assuming 
that its new value is 1 . 0. If the event 
probability appears in a term which is a sum, 
the value of the sum term is autoll1atically 1 . 0 
(and no more than 1.0). If it appears in a 
product, the value of the term is the same as 
if the given event is removed from the product . 
2. Recalculate the probability of the top event 
using the result of step 1 (above) for the 
value of the term in which the given basic 
event appears. 
3. Hultiply the result of step 2 (above) by the 
given probability of the basic event . 
The number resulting from the last calculation is a measure 
of the criticality of the basic event. Those basic events having 
the highest criticality numbers are the first to be considered for 
corrective action . 
. , 
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c. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis is a relatively simple 
and direct approach for identifying basic sources of failure and 
their consequences. The method was developed by reliabi l ity 
engineers to determine problems that could arise from malfunctions 
of hardware. The method is not rigi t and can be used for widel y 
differing applications. The primary purpcse of the analysis is to 
identify and remove failures that can cause hazards . However , as a 
side benefit, the analysis also leads to the identification of 
. failures that are in themselves not hazardous but might affect the 
reliability of the functioning of a system. The results of such an 
analysis also may serve as an input to a Fault Tree . 
A Fail ure Modes and Effects l~alysis is carried out by fi l ling 
in a table havi ng column headings such as those shown in Figure 13. 
Several different formats are shown in this figure to indicate that 
the metilod is not rigid and that an analyst may choose his own fonnat 
o n the basis of his experience and needs to make the analysis most 
useful for the specific application . The column headings shown in 
Figure 13 a r e self- explanatory . This type of analysis is generally 
qualitative only , but not necessarily so . Col umns with headings such 
as Failure Frequency , Probability of Occurrence , Failure Rate , or 
Mean-Tirne-Between- Failures , may include either rel ative terms or 
numeric values for specific items if such values are available. 
'l'he level of detail to which the analysis is carried is a 
problem that must be resolved by the analyst depending on the purpose 
COOPONENT - FAILURE MODE DIRECT EFFECT ON Hl\Zl\RD RECOMMENDED 
EFFECT SYSTEM CATEGORY CHANGE 
• 
COMPONENT OPERATING FAILURE HAZARDOUS FAILURE HAZARD 
MODE HODE ASPECT FREQUENCY CATEGORY REMJ\RKS 
ITEM FAILURE FAILURE POSSIBLE HAZARD SOURCE CORRECTIVE 




Fig ~ 13. Sample Formats f or Failure- Mode s-And-Ef!ects Analysis 
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of the analysis. For example , if the system being analyzed is a 
coupling unit for a tanker car , a complete chasis may be considered 
as a single element in the system, especially if a numerical value 
is available for the reliability of such a chasis . The analyst would 
consider all possible modes of failure of the chasis as a whole, 
and would examine the possible consequences of a failure. At the 
other extreme, each individual component of that coupling unit might 
be considered as a separate element of the system. 
For an extensive system consisting of a number of subsystems, 
it may be advisable to divide the system into portions that can be 
handled conveniently . If the probability or likelihood of occurrence 
of a failure is of primary interest , the component level to whicr. the 
analysis is carried out would depend on the level for which reliability 
data are available. Thus if reliability data are available for an 
assembly, there would be no need to analyze the failure modes of each 
component within the assembly. 
To carry out a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, the analyst 
must have a thorough understanding of all components of the system and 
of their functions. This understanding may be obtained from drawings, 
written descriptions, or in the case of small hardware assemblies, 
by the actual disassembly of the unit into all its components. The 
elements of the system being analyzed should be listed in a logical 
sequence so none are omitted. 
For each component listed, the analyst must identify and list 
all conceivable modes of failure or abnormal functioning. He must 
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then postulate that each such failure or malfunction has indeed 
occurred and then examine all possible tmmediate consequences, and 
the overall effect on the system. Partial failures are not 
considered. It should be noted that a given component may have 
more than one mode of failure, and each mode of failure may have 
more than one effect or consequence. Thus each failure should be 
considered individually and all consequences of the given failure 
should be analyzed. The analyst must also attempt to determine 
how a given failure can be prevented, how critical is each 
consequence if the failure occurs, and how can criticality of the 
consequence be reduced. 
Generally, a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis is first 
accomplished on a qualitative basis. Quantitative data may then be 
applied to establish a reliability or failure level for the system 
or subsystem. Usually four failure modes are considered (12): 
1. Premature operation of a component 
2. Failure of a component to operate at a 
prescribed time 
3. Failure of a component to cease· operation 
at a prescribed time 
4. Failure of a component during operation 
In its original usages, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
detennined where improvenen ts in component life or design were 
necessary; and because failure intervals and probabilities were 
estimated, maintenance periods and requirements could be established. 
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It has proven effective for both purposes. Deficiencies can be 
eliminated or minimized through design changes , redundancies, 
incorporation of fail- safe features, ~~d closer control of critical 
characteristics during manufacture and use. 
While simple and direct, this method also has certain 
limitations. The most serious is the fact that in dealing with 
specific failures of individual components, it does not reveal 
possible failure of the system that may be caused by a combination 
of events, none of \olhich would be considered hazardous when taken 
by itself. Similarly, since the method is primarily hardware 
oriented, it is also unlikely to reveal a system failure that may 
cane about from the combined effect of a component fault. , which in 
i tself is not hazardous , but which would create a serious hazard in 
combination with an abnormal environmental condition , or in 
combination with a human error . Figure 14 shows a schematic drawing, 
and list of components of an end-of- car cushioning unit for which 
an example of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis , is given in 
Table 6 (13). The analyses are self- explanatory . It should be noted 
that the blank columns with headings only are sho~~ in this example 
to jndicate that the format is quite arbitrary and can be arranged 
as desired by the individual analyst. 



















Description ______ _ 
Coupler knuckle pin 
Coupler knuckle 




Center si ll 
Back stop plate 
Rear lug casting 
Striker castil~g 
Omplcr key 
OJ.s hioning unit 
Restoring mcch.)ni~m 
Inspection plate 
Rear crOGS k/'J:y 
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D. Probabilistic Cost Analysis 
To aid the industry in an attempt to address safety costs, 
consider the probabilistic behavior of accident systems . It will be 
useful to classify accident systems into two types, simple and 
canplex (14). 
A simple system can be described by a single event rate 
occurring over elements of time. This rate may be depressed by the 
expenditure of prevention resources. 
A complex system may be described as the interaction of two 
or more events in the accident causation chain. 
It can be shown that if we know the rate of occurrence of an 
a ccident event in a given unit of time, t , the probability of no 




- At = e 
= event rate 
t = number of units of base time, t 
~~e prob~)ility of at least one accident can be computed as follows: 
P(at l east 1) = 1 - P (o) 
Noting that in rare events, which most simple accident systems are, 
the probability of at least 1 will compromise the majority of the 
probability space , the expected cost of an accident can be computed 
from d1e mean cost of the particular accident event being examined. 
E(cost) = p el) x cost 
The cost used in this computation will be the sum of the direct and 
indirect accident event costs . 
· . 89 
An example will illustrate this method. Assume that we are 
concerned with a train derailment resulting in the loss of several 
freight cars. This occurs once in 106 train hours. The accident 
rate is 1 x 10-6 • 
Assuming that within a given companyls commercial operations 
there arc 400,000 train hours a year, the probability of at least 
one train accident in one year is: 
Plat least 1) = 1 P (0) 






















If it is found that the average accident cost" associated with an 
accident of this type is $100,000 then the annual expected cost can 
be computed as follows: 
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Expected cost = Event probability x Event cost 
E (c)l = $26 , 810 - ---- - - Expected cost of one accident 
E (c ) 2 = $10,720 ------- Expected cost of two accidents 
E (c) 3 = $ 2 , 144 ------- Expected cost of three accidents 
$39 , 674 ------- TOtal Expected Cost 
(neglecting the cost of more 
than three accidents) 
The expected annual cost of this type of accident may be 
considered the value of the accident. This is a piece of hard 
information which will be of significant assistance in reaching a 
decision as to how much to effectively invest to reduce this type 
of accident. 
The complex accident usually results in much higher costs 
per accident with low-er probabilities. If we examine the ITOre costly 
of the multiple event activities, the output of the probabilis.tic 
examination of the events is a probability density function P(x). 
The cost of such an accident may also be described by a function 




= J P(x)C(x) dx 
_00 
The expected value as defined above exists only if the integral is 
convergent. In addition, the determination of the functions P(x) 
and C{x) may be difficult in many cases. HoW\:!ver, some very simple 
methods may be used to give a very good approximation of the expected 
cost. 
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Assume that we have a diesel engine with three brake control 
systems. If we lose all three systems, engine control will be lost 
and a catastrophic accident will result . A brief consideration of 
the costs of accidents described previously may place the mean cost 
of such an accident at $20,000,000. 
By component analysis and laboratory test, the mean time 
between failures (MTBF) of the three brake control systems is 
determined to be the following: 
system A 103 hours 
System B 3.1 x 10
3 
hours 
System C 5.4 x 10
2 
hours 
Assume eight hour trips and all three systems operative at the 
beginning of each trip, 1,000 eight hour trips per engine of this 
type each year, the expected cost may be computed as follows: 
-8/10 3 
P(l)A = 1 - e = .008 
P (1) B 1 -
-8/3.1 x 10
3 
.0026 = e = 
P (1) C 1 -
e-8/ 5 . 4 x 10
2 
.015 = = 
P(l)ABC = 3.12 x 10-
7 
P(l) 1 - (l-P(I) )1000_ 
1 yr. = ABC 
-4 
3.12 x 10 
The probability of an accident of this type occurring in one year is 
difficult to evaluate as to criticality. However, when the expected 
cost is computed, the annual value of this type of accident is given 
necessary visibility 




) = $6,240 
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The assumption that pel) is the probability of exactly one accident, 
rather than at least one, and that only one may occur ",,'ill result in 
an expected cost somewhat lower than the true value. However , for 
small accident rates the loss in accuracy is small. The lower bound 
on the expected cost can serve as an action signal. If the value is 
large enough to signal corrective action , the true value must also be 
reduced . It is emphasized again that the annual value of a~cident is 
a piece of hard information which will assist in the evaluation of 
the entire safety program. 
Discounting Safety Costs 
Recalling from the total cost curve of Figure 15, we invest 
in safety at one point in time and receive our r e turns from this 
investment at a later point in time, much as in a normal business 
investment. We must consider the time value of money in our 
evaluation of a safety program. 
Figure 16 describes ideal results of a normal business 




, amounting to Capital A will result in return of Capital B 
over the time t - t3 " This will be a good investment if the y 
discounted value of B is equal or greater than A at an interest 
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In the case of safety cos ts, there is no positive return in 
a business sense. There is however, a reduction in fubure accident 
costs. Therefore, a prevention investment is made today to reduce 
future costs to the c;ompany. It is the net present value or the 
discounted value of all of these costs which mus~ be minimized if we 
are to operate with our system at the minimum cost point on a total 
safety resource curve. 
There are three conditions ~nich we may consider in an effort 
to simplify the many variations which will present themselves when 
attempting to perform such an evaluation. 
case I: 
If little is known of the system or its future ppzformance, 
expected costs of accidents cannot be predicted nor can they be 
related to prevention costs. In this case, simple bookkeeping may 
be helpful in locating the system on the safety resource curve of 
Figure 15. At the conclusion of each fiscal year, prevention and 
accident costs .... 'ould be totaled. If the system is new, as it must be, 
an increasing prevention effort is indicated. The trend of total 
costs should be down. There may be years in which the costs go up 
due to the lag between prevention programs and accident reduction. 
A persistent upward trend in total safety costs would indicate that 
perhaps the prevention program is too large. This cannot be the 
case if the prevention program is a small fraction of the accident 
costs . Inflation can be a problem here and must be removed from the 
96 
computations in this metnod of analysis. This technique is 
analogous to the federal and state methods of financial accounting 
in which the books are closed at the end of the fiscal year with no 
effort to account for the return to society from the resources 
invested during the current year. Figure 17 depicts this method 
of safety value analysis . 
TOTAL COST OF SYSTEM SAFETY 
ACCI ENT OS 
P .VENT ON 
o Time (in years) 
Fig_ 17 . Federal and 
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Frequently specific safety projects can be identified. These 
projects require a large investment of resources at a point in time. 
It is hoped that future reduction in accident costs will in some way 
canpensate for this invesbnent. 
An attractive attribute of using dollars to measure the value 
of a safety project is that from the point of view of society, their 
value remains linear relative to total worth. It is, therefore, 
possihle to separate specific projects from the total system safety 
analysis. 
Figure 18 illustrates this method of analysis. It can be 
seen that if the discounted value of the future accident cost 
attributable to the project is equal to or greater than the initial 
investment cost of the project, the project is justifiable in that 
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= cost of prevention or co~t of this project 
= expected accident cost reduct ion 
= interest rate, usually the cost of 
capital for the project 
= number of periods to the planning 
horizo n for this project 
Fig_ 18. Cost of a Specific Project 
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Case 3 : 
The third and more genera l case of system sa f ety value 
anal ysis is the condition of continuous expenditure to the p l anning 
horizon for accident preventi on. This expendi ture should be 
accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the expected cost of 
accidents. The discounted value of the cost reduction must be 
greater than the discounted v alue of the prevention costs. Figure 
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Fig . 19. Discounted Val ue of Prevention Cost 
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The safety department continually finds itself in competition for 
company resources in the process of implementation of their safety 
programs. Traditionally the method of "selling" their program is 
to invoke the spector of a catastrophe or to insist that the system 
requires a greater degree of safety. In this situation, competing 
against we ll documented and quantifiable dl::mands for r esource 
application to other elements of the system, the safety department 




In conclusion, it should be reiterated that the railroad 
industry has a history of pursuing and solving safety problems. 
The extreme magnitude and complexity of the total American railroad 
system, makes identification and control of all potential hazards 
an extremely involved task. While it is not possible to examine 
the American railroad system in the concept stage, it is however , 
now possible to analyze incremental changes in subsystems for their 
potential impact on the entire system. Implementation of appropriate 
changes within the existing system can and will result in control 
and elimination of hazards in the railroad industry . 
A comprehensive system safety program is defined as the 
selection and implementation of the mechanisms necessary for 
achieving and maintaining an optimum level of safety in the operations 
of the railroad industry. It encompasses the total definition of 
policy, organization, operational control, evaluation, and 
corrective action - considering the railroad capability of the 
nation as a system and safety as a principal objective of that 
system. 
By utilizing the systematic approach to safety, railroad 
accidents can be predicted and analyzed before they occur. They 
can then be prevented by taking the action necessary to eliminate 
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or control the hazards which lead to accidents. System safety 
analysis methods will identify possible hazards. Risks will not 
be assumed unknowingly. Those risks which are assumed will be those 
that have been identified , and in which a management decision has 
been made to accept them. This approach avoids crises by foreseeing 
them. 
The benefits to be derived from the system safety approach go 
far beyond the prevention of an accident. The resources allocated 
for system safety are well spent. In addition to the large sums 
needed to settle accident claims, make repairs to the system and 
restore the environment, consideration must be given to the value 
of the operating company's reputation, image, and future business 
potential. One accident that could have been avoided can cost many 
times the price of an effective analysis effort. 
A number of the accidents investigated by the Federal Railroad 
Administration revealed the existence of hazards that were activated 
into accidents . System safety analysis would have made these hazards 
known and given management a chance to correct them before the 
accident occurred. 
The system safety organization may be defined as the group of 
people responsible for establishing, managing and performing the 
overall system safety progra~. This definition places no constraints 
upon the size or the character of the safety organization . Further-
more, the de finition is equally applicable to system safety 
organizations that may be identified as a single entity and to those 
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that are widely diffused and cannot be represented on a conventional 
organization chart as a single entity. Although one cannot prescribe 
a unique system safety organization on a prior basis, the functions 
and responsibilities of all persons associated with establishing 
policy or implementing any aspects of the safety program should be 
clearly established. 
The System Safety Programs presented in the hypothetical model 
is one approach to utilizing the principles of System Safety as 
developed and used in the Aerospace Industry. It is believed to be 
an effective approach in that it addresses the basic goal of accident 
prevention through the judicious application of hazard identification 
techniques such as fault trees, evaluates the hazards using 
qualitative decision tree logic, and assures the implementation of 
elimination or control measures consistent with the hazard precedence 
sequence expounded as an integral part of system safety. On the 
other hand, it is designed to take full advantage of rail industry 
experience accumulated by owners, builders, and the using public. 
It is obvious that r ail transit hazards having the potential 
for catastrophic results are collision and derailment which can 
r esult from failures of critical car systems , wayside equipment , 
the running rajl, operating personnel or any combination . Therefore, 
the prevention of oollisions or derailments will best be achieved 
from the car standpoint by enhancing the failsafety of contributing 
systems. At the same tillIe, continued application of "lessons 
learned" from accidents which have happened must be made. The 
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hazard associated with mixing different types of car construction 
and brake systems in the same service is an example of one such 
lesson learned. 
Hazards resulting individually in much less severe consequences 
also must be given continued attention since greater frequencies of 
occurrence can easily reach a high cumulative severity. To this 
end the interfaces between the car and its environment including the 
using public must be evaluated in the interests of safety enhancement. 
If the foregoing safety actions are applied, using the 
application of System Safety principles described or ones similar to 
them, rail trans it will continue to be a leader as a safe mode of 
transportaticn and \>"i11 eOJen imprcve as rail tra:1sit expands. 
The objective of this thesis was to explore and consider such 
system safety programs and techniques that would ehhance the accident 
and fatality problem in the rail industry. It is recognized that 
these initial efforts only serve to open the door and that much more 
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